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The concern of this paper is the aggregation of sets of rationally connected 
judgments that the members of a group individually endorse into a corresponding, 
collectively endorsed set of judgments. After documenting the need for various 
groups to aggregate judgments, we explain how this task is challenged by the 
"doctrinal" or "discursive" paradox. We then show that this paradox is not just an 
artifact of certain specific situations, but that it actually illustrates a new 
impossibility theorem, according to which there exists no systematic mechanism for 
generally solving relevant types of aggregation problems in accordance with some 
undemanding conditions. This new result highlights a tension between two 
plausible demands: on the one hand, that a group be responsive to the judgments of 
individual members in forming collective judgments and, on the other, that it be 
rational in the judgments it collectively endorses. We consider at some length how 
groups can deal with this problem and evade our impossibility result, and we look 
at some established practices whereby they manage to do so. A formal proof of the 
new theorem is presented in an appendix. 
Suppose that the members of a certain group each hold a rational set of 
judgments on some interconnected questions. And imagine that the group itself 
now has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How 
should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is 
subject to a difficulty that has recently come to attention in discussion of the 
doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general 
impossibility theorem that that difficulty illustrates. Our paper is given to the 
presentation of this impossibility result and an exploration of its significance. The 
result naturally invites comparison with Kenneth Arrow’s famous theorem 
(Arrow 1963; Sen 1970; Arrow 1984) and we elaborate that  comparison in a 
companion paper (List and Pettit 2002).  
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The paper is in four sections. The first section documents the need for 
various groups to aggregate the sets of judgments maintained by members on 
certain issues; the second presents the discursive paradox that arises with the 
aggregation of sets of judgments; and then the third gives an informal statement 
of the impossibility result that the paradox illustrates: the formal proof is 
presented in an appendix. The fourth, lengthier section discusses some escape-
routes from the impossibilty result, asking how groups can manage — and do in 
practice  manage — to get around the implications of the result. 
1. The Task of Aggregating Judgment 
The task of aggregating sets of judgments — for short, aggregating 
judgment — should be distinguished from two distinct tasks. First, the task of 
aggregating people’s sets of credences in respect of certain propositions, where 
these are tantamount to degrees of confidence that these propositions obtain. 
And second, the task of aggregating people’s preference orderings in respect of 
the alternative options or candidates available in some collective choice problem.  
Judgments are modelled on acts of assent or dissent, assertion or denial, 
and differ from credences in not allowing of degrees of confidence. Under our 
concept of judgment, there is no such thing as judging to a certain degree that 
something is or is not the case; while someone may be prepared to judge only 
that something is probable in a certain degree, a judgment in the present sense 
will always be an on or off affair. It may be interesting to ask how the credences 
of people should be aggregated in a certain area but we here restrict our attention 
to the aggregation of judgment. We are interested in groups which try to form 
collective judgments in respect of certain issues on the basis of the judgments 
held and expressed by individuals in respect of those issues.  
The challenge involved in the aggregation of preference orderings arises 
wherever a group needs to make a decision about some issue on the basis of the 
preferences of its members over the available alternatives: the challenge may be 
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large or small in scale, ranging from the electoral case of a population selecting a 
party or a policy to the case of a group of friends selecting a restaurant at which 
to have a meal. The crucial difference between aggregating preference orderings 
and aggregating sets of judgments is this. The problem of aggregating preference 
orderings arises with issues that are treated as independent, the task being to 
produce a collective ranking of the various alternatives in each issue. The 
problem with aggregating sets of judgments arises with a number of issues that 
are treated as interconnected rather than independent, the task being to produce 
a rational collective set of judgments on those different issues.1  
The task of aggregating sets of judgments arises in many different 
contexts. Consider the sort of group that is charged by an external authority with 
making certain decisions according to designated principles and particularly on 
the basis of multiple premises. Examples of such groups are appointment and 
promotions committees; committees charged with deciding who is to win a 
certain prize or contract; trusts that have to make judgments on the basis of a 
trustee’s instructions; associations or the executives of associations that have to 
justify their actions by reference to the group’s charter; corporations that have to 
comply with policies endorsed by their shareholders; public bodies, be they 
bureaucratic committees or appointed boards, that have to discharge specific 
briefs; and governments that are more or less bound to party programs and 
principles.  
In each of these cases the group will have to make a set of judgments on 
the relevant premises and on the resulting decision. The promotions committee, 
for instance, will have to make a judgment on whether a candidate is formally 
qualified for the promotion, on whether the candidate has sufficient experience, 
on whether he or she is likely to establish good working relations with his or her 
colleagues after the promotion, and finally whether he or she should be 
promoted. And so on in other cases. In each case the group will naturally want to 
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make a set of judgments that satisfies twin conditions. On the one hand, it will 
want the judgments reached to be responsive to the judgments of members. On 
the other hand, the group will want the judgments to constitute a rational set of 
judgments in themselves.  
For other examples of the aggregation of judgment consider purposive 
groups more generally, whether or not they are formally bound by certain 
external, antecedently designated principles.  It may still be an important 
aspiration in these groups that members should find common principles by 
which to justify whatever line they collectively take on any particular issue.  
Think of the political party that has to work out a program for government; or 
the association that has to decide on the terms of its constitution; or the church 
that has to give an account of itself in the public forum; or the learned academy 
that seeks a voice in the larger world of politics and journalism. In such cases 
members of the group may not be presented by an external authority with 
antecedently designated principles on the basis of which to justify particular 
judgments. But the need to answer as a group to individuals in their own ranks, 
or to bodies in the outside world, will support a wish to reach judgments 
according to general principles rather than in an ad hoc fashion. For every 
particular issue that it faces, the group will want to be able to make a judgment 
on that issue that is rationally connected with other judgments that it 
simultaneously makes according to those principles; and it will want to be able to 
do this in a manner that reflects the judgments of members on those matters.2  
These examples of how groups are required to aggregate judgment will 
suffice for purposes of introducing the problem we address in this paper. But it is 
worth noting that a very similar problem arises for any group that claims to 
promote a purpose (Pettit 2001a, ch. 4; Pettit 2001b). Such a group may only 
rarely have to try and resolve a set of issues that arise at one and the same time, 
in the manner of the examples just mentioned. But it will routinely find itself 
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faced with an issue on which judgments previously endorsed — and now a 
matter of record — have a rational bearing. Suppose that a political party 
announces in January, say on the basis of majority vote among its members, that 
it will reduce taxes if it gets into government. Suppose that it announces in June, 
again on the basis of majority vote, that it will increase defence spending. And 
now imagine that it faces the issue in September as to whether it will reduce 
government spending in other areas of policy or organisation. The connection 
between this issue and the ones previously resolved means that it will have to 
resolve that issue in the context of sustaining or revising its judgments on the 
other issues as well. It will also face a task of aggregating the sets of judgments 
that its members make on those different issues.  
2. The Paradox in Aggregating Judgment 
We now introduce a paradox that affects the aggregation of judgment. 
This was identified by scholars in law and economics when they drew attention 
to a problem that affects multi-member courts as a result of their having to 
decide certain cases — according to legal doctrine — on the basis of a resolution 
of  related issues. (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Kornhauser 1992; Kornhauser 
1992; Kornhauser and Sager 1993; Chapman 1998; Chapman 1998; Brennan 2001). 
The problem has sometimes been described in this literature as the doctrinal 
paradox.  
A good example of the doctrinal paradox is provided by this simple case 
where a three-judge court has to decide on whether a defendant is liable under a 
charge of breach of contract (Kornhauser and Sager 1993, 11). According to legal 
doctrine, the court should find against the defendant if and only if it finds, first 
that a valid contract was in place, and second that the defendant’s behaviour was 
such as to breach a contract of that kind. Now imagine that the three judges, 1, 2 
and 3, vote as follows on those issues and on the derivable matter of whether the 
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defendant is indeed liable. The ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on any row represents the disposition 
of the relevant judge to accept or reject the corresponding premise or conclusion. 
Valid contract?  Breach?    Liable? 
1   yes   no    no 
2  no   yes    no 
3  yes   yes    yes 
Matrix 1 
There are two ways in which the court might in principle make its 
decision in a case like this. It might have the judges do their individual reasoning 
and then aggregate their votes on the conclusion — the liability issue — on, say,  
a majority basis. Since the conclusion does not command majority support, the 
defendant would go free. Call this the conclusion-driven approach. Or the court 
might have the judges aggregate their votes on the individual premises — the 
contract and breach issues — and let the resulting, collective judgments on those 
premises determine what it rules on the conclusion. Since each premise 
commands majority support, the result in this case is that the defendant would 
be found liable. Call this the premise-driven approach. The doctrinal paradox, as 
presented in the jurisprudential literature, consists in the fact that the two 
procedures described yield different outcomes.  
This sort of paradox will arise, not just when legal doctrine dictates that 
certain considerations are conceptually or epistemically prior to a certain issue  
— an issue on which a conclusion has to be reached — and that judgments on 
those considerations ought to dictate the judgment on the conclusion. It arises 
more generally whenever a group of people discourse together with a view to 
forming an opinion on a certain matter that rationally connects, by the lights of 
all concerned, with other issues. It constitutes a discursive, not just a doctrinal, 
dilemma.  
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For an example that is close to the case just discussed, consider an issue 
that might arise in a workplace, among the employees of a company: say, for 
simplicity, a company owned by the employees (Pettit 2001b). The issue is 
whether to forego a pay-rise in order to spend the money thereby saved on 
introducing a workplace safety measure: perhaps a guard against electrocution. 
Let us suppose for convenience that the employees are to make the decision — 
perhaps because of prior resolution — on the basis of considering three separable 
issues: first, how serious the danger is; second, how effective the safety measure 
that a pay-sacrifice would buy is likely to be; and third, whether the pay-sacrifice 
is bearable for members individually.  If an employee thinks that the danger is 
sufficiently serious, the safety measure sufficiently effective, and the pay-sacrifice 
sufficiently bearable, he or she will vote for the sacrifice; otherwise they will vote 
against. And so each will have to consider the three issues and then look to what 
should be concluded about the pay-sacrifice.  
Imagine now that after appropriate dialogue and deliberation the 
employees are disposed to vote on the relevant premises and conclusion in the 
pattern illustrated by the following matrix for a group of three workers. The 
numerals 1, 2, and 3 represent the three employees and the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on any 
row represents the disposition of the relevant employee to accept or reject the 
corresponding premise or conclusion. 
Serious danger? Effective measure? Bearable loss? Pay-sacrifice? 
1   yes   no   yes  no 
2  no   yes   yes  no 
3  yes   yes   no  no 
Matrix 2 
If this is the pattern in which the employees are inclined to vote, then a 
different decision will be made, depending on whether the group judgment is 
driven by how members judge on the premises or by how they judge on the 
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conclusion. Looking at the matrix, we can see that though everyone individually 
rejects the pay-sacrifice, a majority supports each of the premises. If we think that 
the views of the employees on the conclusion should determine the group-
decision, then we will say that the group-conclusion should be to reject the pay-
sacrifice: there are only ‘no’s’ in the final column. But if we think that the views 
of the employees on the premises should determine the group-decision, then we 
will say that the group-conclusion should be to accept the pay-sacrifice: there is a 
majority of ‘yes’s’ in each of the premise columns.  
The doctrinal or discursive paradox arises in the cases considered because, 
while each premise commands a majority, the majorities involved are distinct 
and the intersection of the majorities — those who will vote for the conclusion, 
given they vote for all the premises — is itself a minority in the group as a whole; 
in this last case it has no members at all, in the previous case it has just one 
member, person 3. The paradox generalises in many different ways. It may arise 
with disjunctive as well as conjunctive reasoning, since a disjunctive set of 
premises, P or Q, will support a conclusion R just in case the conjunctive set of 
premises, ¬P and ¬Q, supports the negation of that conclusion. It may arise 
whenever there are three or more propositions involved. It may arise whenever 
there are three or more persons involved. And so on. 
The important lesson of the discursive paradox from the perspective of 
this paper is not the lesson emphasised in the jurisprudential literature: that there 
is a hard choice between letting the collective judgment on the conclusion be 
decided by the votes on the conclusion itself or by the votes on the premises. 
Rather it is the more general lesson that if we go the normal, majoritarian way in 
aggregating a collective set of judgments from individual sets of judgments, even 
from individual sets that are themselves entirely rational, then we may end up 
with a collective set that is irrational. While every individual in each of our 
examples is perfectly rational in their pattern of assent to premises and 
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conclusion, the collectivity would not be rational in its pattern of assent if it 
followed the procedure of majority voting on each of the premises and also on the 
conclusion. It would not be rational in that it would reject the conclusion in each 
case, while endorsing premises that support it.  
A group in the sort of predicament illustrated faces a hard choice, as the 
jurisprudential literature says, but the options are more general than those 
associated with privileging the conclusion-votes and privileging the premise-
votes. The group may allow the votes of the members on each of a rationally 
connected set of issues to determine the view of the collectivity on that issue, in 
which case there is a risk of the collectivity’s holding an irrational set of views. 
Or the group may take steps to ensure that the collective view espoused will be 
rational, in which case it may be necessary to ignore the vote of the majority on 
some issue. We may describe the first alternative as that of ensuring individual 
responsiveness — that is, the responsiveness of the collective view to individual 
votes — and the second as that of ensuring collective rationality.  
Enfranchising the votes of individuals on the conclusion, where that is 
part of a broader project of enfranchising the votes of individuals on each of the 
issues raised in the premises and the conclusion, means ensuring individual 
responsiveness. Enfranchising the votes of individuals on the premises, and 
letting the collective views thereby determined fix the collective conclusion, is an 
instance of ensuring collective rationality. But while it is an instance of that 
strategy, it is not the only way of pursuing it. The members of the group might 
ensure collective rationality, not by rejecting the view taken by majority vote on 
the conclusion, but rather by rejecting the view taken by majority vote on one of 
the premises. They might be open to the possibility of practising modus tollens 
instead of modus ponens.  
The discursive paradox brings out the tension between two plausible 
demands that we might want to make on the aggregation of judgment. The first 
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is the demand that in aggregating judgment a group should be responsive to the 
views of members on each of the judgments involved. The second is the demand 
that in aggregating judgment a group should reach a collective set of judgments 
that is itself rational. The paradox shows that the two demands are sometimes in 
conflict, so that a group that tries to aggregate judgment faces a dilemma. It may 
seek to be responsive to the judgments of individuals, thereby risking collective 
rationality. Or it may seek to ensure collective rationality, thereby risking 
responsiveness to the judgments of individuals. The discursive paradox is a 
discursive dilemma. 
3.  A Simple Impossibility Result on the Aggregation of Judgment  
The cases of the discursive paradox that we considered show that if we 
take the sets of views held among a group of people on a range of propositions 
then, even if those sets of views each satisfy rationality constraints — even if they 
are each consistent and the like — the set of collective views derived by majority 
voting on each issue may not satisfy such rationality constraints. This suggests 
that a procedure like systematic majority voting — majority voting on each issue 
— can never be guaranteed against producing an irrational set of collective 
judgments.  
These intuitive considerations point us towards the prospect of a general 
proof that any procedure that is akin to majority voting in certain ways — that 
satisfies various conditions, yet to be identified, that are exemplified in majority 
voting — will be vulnerable to this paradoxical possibility. They suggest the 
prospect of establishing the impossibility of finding a procedure for aggregating 
judgment that satisfies such conditions and that is proof against paradox. We 
present the intuitive elements of our result in this section; a formal proof is given 
in an appendix.  
Let us suppose that we have a set of individuals, N, each named by a 
numeral: 1, 2, 3, …, n; we assume that N has at least two members. And let X be 
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the set of propositions on which judgments are to be made, including atomic 
propositions like P and Q and compound propositions such as (P∧Q), (P∨Q), 
((P∧Q)→¬R), and so on; we assume that X contains at least two distinct atomic 
propositions, P, Q, their conjunction, (P∧Q), and the negation of their conjunction 
¬(P∧Q). 
We can identify the set of judgments made by an individual, i,  in respect 
of X —  we call them i’s personal set of judgments — with the set of those 
propositions in X to which he or she assents. Notice that this means that dissent 
— saying ‘no’ or ‘false’ to a proposition — does not involve making a judgment 
in respect of it; person i will make a judgment, strictly speaking, only if he or she 
also says ‘yes’ or ‘true’ to the negation of the proposition. The individual’s 
personal set of judgments will thus be a subset Φi of X. With this notion secure, 
we can define the profile of personal sets of judgments that are held across the 
group, N, as the n-tuple of those personal sets of judgments: {Φi}i∈N. 
A personal set of judgments Φi may or may not satisfy rationality 
constraints. We assume that all personal sets of judgments in the group, N, 
satisfy three such constraints. We describe these, in standard terminology, as 
completeness, consistency and deductive closure.  A personal set of judgments Φi 
will be complete if, for all propositions φ in X, either φ or its negation ¬φ (or 
unnegated form ψ in case φ = ¬ψ) is contained in the set Φi to which the person 
assents. It will be consistent if there is no proposition φ in X such that both φ and 
¬φ are contained in Φi.3 And it will be deductively closed if, whenever Φi logically 
entails some other proposition ϕ in X, ϕ is also contained in Φi. 
With these definitions and assumptions in place, the question that arises is 
whether there is any procedure of aggregation such that from the complete, 
consistent and deductively closed personal sets of judgments that individuals 
endorse it will allow the group to derive a collective set of judgments that is also 
complete, consistent and deductively closed. In particular, the question is 
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whether there is any procedure for doing this that satisfies some minimal 
conditions. 
The lesson of the discursive paradox is that a majoritarian procedure will 
fail under certain profiles of personal sets of judgments to yield a collective set of 
judgments that is deductively closed and consistent. Consider the following 
table, which is closely related to the first matrix used above in illustrating the 
discursive paradox. It tells us what each person’s judgment is in respect of each 
of the propositions in the top row and also what the majority judgment is on 
each of those propositions. 
 P Q (P∧Q) ¬(P∧Q) 
Person 1 true true true false 
Person 2 true false false true 
Person 3 false true false true 
Majority true true false true 
Table 1 
In the scenario described in this table, each personal set of judgments 
satisfies completeness, consistency and deductive closure but the group will fail 
to do so under a majoritarian procedure of aggregation. A majority supports P 
and a majority supports Q, but (P∧Q) does not get majority support. That means 
that the collective set of judgments is not deductively closed; it does not include 
the judgment that (P∧Q), though that proposition is entailed by other 
propositions in the set: that is, P and Q. And not only that. The proposition 
¬(P∧Q) is in the group’s collective set of judgments. So if the group's procedure 
is to endorse the deductive closure of its majority judgments (rather than just those 
majority judgments) as its collective set of judgments, then the resulting 
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collective set of judgments will be inconsistent: it contains P, Q, (P∧Q) and 
¬(P∧Q).  
So a majoritarian procedure for aggregating judgment will fail under 
some profiles of personal sets of judgments to generate a collective set of 
judgments that score like the personal sets in the properties of completeness, 
consistency and deductive closure. But is the problem tied to the use of the 
majoritarian procedure? Or can we identify features of majoritarianism such that 
any aggregation procedure with those features will fail in the same way? Our 
theorem shows that the answer to this question is positive.  
Take a procedure or function F, to be called a judgment aggregation function, 
whose input is a profile of personal sets of judgments, {Φi}i∈N, and whose output 
is a corresponding collective set of judgments, Φ, to be endorsed by the group as a 
whole. The argument is that no F that satisfies certain minimal conditions — 
conditions that majoritarianism and many other aggregation procedures satisfy 
— can generate collective judgments that display completeness, consistency and 
deductive closure.  
The minimal conditions that we specify are these. 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). A judgment aggregation function, F, should accept as 
admissible input any logically possible profile of personal sets of judgments — 
any logically possible n-tuple {Φi}i∈N — provided each person's set of judgments, 
Φi, satisfies the conditions of completeness, consistency and deductive closure.  
ANONYMITY (A).  The collective set of judgments, Φ, that is yielded by F should 
be invariant under any permutation of the individuals in N. (Intuitively, this 
requires that people should be treated in an even-handed way by the aggregation 
function; no one individual’s judgments should be given special weight in 
determining the collective judgments.)   
SYSTEMATICITY (S). For any two propositions φ and ψ in X, if every individual in 
N makes exactly the same judgment (acceptance/rejection) on φ as he or she 
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makes on ψ, then the collective judgment (acceptance/rejection) on φ should also 
be the same as that on ψ, and the same pattern of dependence of collective 
judgments on individual ones should hold for all profiles in the domain of F. 
(Intuitively, this requires that propositions or issues should be treated in an even-
handed way by the aggregation function; the collective judgment on each 
proposition should depend exclusively on the pattern of individual judgments 
on that proposition. In particular, the collective judgment on no proposition 
should be given special weight in determining the collective judgments on 
others.) 
The condition of universal domain is scarcely contestable. An aggregation 
procedure could hardly be described as fully satisfactory if its success depended 
on the particular profile of personal sets of judgments that happens to be 
presented for aggregation. If it is to be fully satisfactory, then it must work for 
any logically possible profile of personal sets of judgments. So at any rate it 
seems natural to think.  
The condition of anonymity is also compelling. Anonymity stipulates that 
no one’s identity ought to matter in determining the result that the aggregation 
procedure yields. It may be important, for example, that a majority of such and 
such a size supports a given proposition but it cannot be important that a 
majority with such and such  members does so.  
The condition of systematicity says, somewhat more controversially, that 
the collective judgment on any proposition should depend only on the personal 
judgments in respect of that proposition and that there should be no difference 
between the ways in which different collective judgments depend on relevant 
personal judgments.4 We can express this by saying that if two propositions have 
support from just the same people, then they ought to attract the same collective 
response. Combined with anonymity, that implies that if two propositions have 
the same degree of support, though perhaps from different people, then they 
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ought to attract the same collective response: if majoritarianism rules in one case, 
it ought to rule in the other, and so on.  
These conditions are minimal in the sense that they will be satisfied by a 
whole range of imaginable aggregation procedures. Not just by majoritarianism, 
intuitively characterised, but also by unanimitarianism and minoritarianism and 
any procedures requiring special majorities of two-thirds and the like. But 
minimal though they are, the formal proof in appendix 1 establishes the 
following theorem:5  
Theorem 1. There exists no judgment aggregation function F generating 
complete, consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments which 
satisfies universal domain, anonymity and systematicity.  
One last comment. We constrain the profiles on the input side of a 
judgment aggregation function by stipulating that they contain only personal 
sets of judgments that are complete, consistent and deductively closed. This is a 
tough constraint that will not often be met in practice. But our theorem is 
strengthened, not weakened, by the stipulation. If the aggregation even of such 
well-behaved sets of personal judgments causes trouble then, a fortiori, the 
aggregation of less well-behaved sets may be expected to do so; logically, our 
theorem will still hold if the domain defined in condition (U) is extended. 
4. Strategies for Evading the Impossibility 
If our argument in the first section is sound, then groups are routinely 
required to aggregate judgment and so there is practical interest in the question 
of how they manage to avoid the problem identified in our impossibility result. If 
groups are going to be a significant presence in social life — in particular, if they 
are to be able to be rationally devoted to a range of different purposes — then 
they must succeed in making and upholding collective sets of judgments that 
satisfy constraints like consistency and deductive closure. So how do they 
manage to do this, given that any procedure that satisfies our conditions of 
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universal domain, anonymity and systematicity is bound to fail them in some 
cases?  
The answer is that, strictly speaking, they don’t manage to do this. They 
ensconce the rule of rationality in their collective lives, as is required of them, 
only at a cost in the extent to which they are responsive to the views of their 
members: in short, only at a cost to universal domain, anonymity or 
systematicity. Or they ensconce not quite the rule of rationality — not quite the 
rule of completeness, consistency and deductive closure — but only something 
that roughly approximates it. There are six general types of strategy for 
'collectivising reason', as we might put it, and they correspond, on the one hand, 
to breaches of the three conditions of universal domain, anonymity and 
systematicity; and, on the other, to shortfalls in completeness, consistency and 
deductive closure. Of these strategies, the first four are capable of being 
operationalised, the last two are not really feasible. We review them briefly in the 
remainder of this section. (For a comparison between these strategies and 
strategies for avoiding the Arrowian impossibility theorem, see List and Pettit 
2002). 
Relaxing universal domain: the convergence strategy 
We mentioned in discussion of the discursive paradox that the problem 
identified there arises because while each premise attracts majority support, 
those majorities diverge widely. The majorities that support the premises in our 
examples of the paradox are such that the intersection between them is a 
minority in the group as a whole. If the intersection of the majorities on all 
premises were itself a majority — in which case, of course, the intersection of the 
majorities on all propositons, premises and conclusion, would be a majority — 
then the resulting profiles of personal sets of judgments would not give rise to 
the discursive paradox.  
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One suggestion might be that a group can ensure that this condition is met 
by encouraging convergence, whether on the basis of increased interpersonal 
deliberation — if that is thought effective in building convergence (but see 
Sunstein 2000) — or by some other means. If a group can moderate the 
divergence in views between its members such that the intersection of the 
majorities on all propositions in any relevant set becomes itself a majority, then 
the paradox will be avoided. With regard to this highly restricted set of profiles 
— as distinct from the unrestricted set allowed under universal domain —  
majoritarian voting will constitute a judgment aggregation function that 
generates a complete, consistent and deductively closed collective set of 
judgments and one that satisfies anonymity and systematicity. (Compare Miller 
1992; Dryzek and List 1999; and List, McLean, Fishkin and Luskin 2000).  
This suggestion raises the question as to whether we can identify any 
structural condition on the profiles of individual judgments in respect of a set of 
propositions such that if individuals converge in satisfying that condition, then 
the impossibility problem will not occur. Should we be able to identify the sort of 
condition envisaged then we could be sure that, starting from any profile of 
individual judgments satisfying the condition, a straightforward procedure like 
majoritarian voting on each proposition would yield a collective set of judgments 
that is consistent, complete and deductively closed.  
As it happens, there is an identifiable condition that plays this role (List 
2001): unidimensional alignment. A profile of sets of individual judgments is 
unidimensionally aligned if the individuals involved can be linearly ordered 
from left to right, as in Table 3, so that for each proposition to be voted on, the 
individuals holding it to be true lie all to the right, or all to the left, of those 
holding it to be false. The impossibility result can be circumvented if the profiles 
admitted in the domain are all unidimensionally aligned in this sense. The 
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theorem, formulated so as to bring out the relationship with the impossibility 
theorem, is this. 
Theorem 2. (List 2001) Suppose that the number of individuals is odd. On the 
domain of unidimensionally aligned profiles of personal sets of judgments, there 
exists a judgment aggregation function F generating complete, consistent and 
deductively closed collective sets of judgments which satisfies anonymity and 
systematicity. 
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  Person 3 Person 1  Person 2 Person 5 Person 4 
P true true true false false 
Q false false  false true true 
(P∧Q) false false false false false 
¬(P∧Q) true true true true true 
Table 3 
The theorem is quite intuitive. Applying propositionwise majoritarian 
voting to the profile in table 3 would result in a collective set of judgments — P, 
¬Q and ¬(P∧Q) — that is  consistent, complete and deductively closed. This is 
precisely the set of judgments held by Person 2, the median person with respect 
to the left-right alignment. So long as the number of individuals is odd, the 
median person will share the majority view on each proposition, and 
consequently the median person's personal set of judgments will be endorsed 
under a procedure of majority voting on each proposition. The completeness, 
consistency and deductive closure of the resulting collective set of judgments is a 
consequence of the completeness, consistency and deductive closure of the 
median person's set of judgments.  
Relaxing anonymity: the authority strategy 
One of the presuppositions in the discursive paradox is, roughly, that each 
person has an equal say; if any one of them had the authority to decide the 
group’s judgments, then there would be no problem. This presupposition is 
registered in the second condition on our impossibility result: that of anonymity. 
As the relaxation of universal domain can provide an escape from the paradox 
and the impossibility result, so the relaxation of anonymity can provide one too. 
Suppose that a particular person is appointed as an authority in the sense that no 
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matter what the profile of personal sets of judgments, this person's set of 
judgments is taken as the overall collective set of judgments. This procedure 
constitutes a judgment aggregation function generating complete, consistent and 
deductively closed collective sets of judgments that satisfies universal domain 
and systematicity but not, of course, anonymity. 
The relaxation involved here goes with the group strategy of naming one 
individual, or perhaps a small set of individuals, as dictator or plenipotentiary. 
More realistically, the plenipotentiary might have the somewhat circumscribed 
power of deciding how the group should go in the event of a paradox arising in 
the aggregation of judgments (formally, this circumscription would involve a 
breach of systematicity too). This power might be not just circumscribed but 
provisional. It might be exercised under the proviso that if a certain number of 
members think that it is badly exercised then they have a right to appeal — and a 
right to be heard by an authoritative judiciary.  
As the first strategy can be associated with the convergence-building 
approach favoured by some deliberative democrats, this second strategy can be 
identified with an approach that prevails implicitly in many corporate bodies. 
The directors are implicitly given authority in such bodies to ensure that, 
however the expressed or presumed views of members go, the body as a whole 
should not fall into collective unreason. That authority may be more or less 
absolute but in the general run of things it will be subject to appeal and reversal; 
even in the commercial corporation, after all, there will always be the possibility 
of a shareholder revolt.  
Relaxing systematicity: the priority strategy 
Another condition on which our impossibility result is based is that if 
majority rule or some other procedure of aggregation is used to decide the 
collective view on some propositions, then that procedure should be used to 
decide the collective view on all. Why should the collective view on some 
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propositions be determined differently from how it is determined on others? Yet 
if the collective view is determined on the same basis for each propositon in a 
given set, that is, if we impose systematicity along with anonymity and universal 
domain, then we know that the collective view will often fail to satisfy rationality 
constraints.  
The obvious response to this observation is to say that what a group ought 
to do, where possible, is to decide with any set of propositions — any potentially 
troubling set of propositions — that some of those propositions should be given 
priority over others and that the decision on the others should be determined by 
the overall decision on the prioritised propositions, not by the same procedure as 
in the prioritised cases. If the pattern of majority support among the prioritised 
propositions rationally requires a certain pattern of support among the other, 
'second-grade' propositions, then that is the pattern that ought to prevail there, 
regardless of whether each of these propositions is accepted or rejected by a 
majority. In particular, suppose a group identifies a subset Y of the set of 
propositions X such that the propositions in Y are considered prior to the 
propositions outside Y and the propositions in Y are logically independent (in the 
technical sense that any combination of truth-values can be consistently assigned 
to them). If the group exercises majority voting only on the propositions in Y 
(jointly with some tie-breaking rule) and then endorses the deductive closure of 
these majority judgments as its collective set of judgments, then this procedure 
constitutes a judgment aggregation function generating consistent and 
deductively closed collective sets of judgments that satisfies universal domain 
and anonymity (but not systematicity). (Note that this procedure may not always 
guarantee completeness, since the majority pattern of acceptance/rejection on the 
epistemically prior propositions in X may not logically determine a unique 
pattern of acceptance/rejection on all other propositions; some propositions 
outside Y -- particularly if they are logically independent from the propositions 
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in Y -- may not be decided by the given acceptance/rejection pattern on the 
prioritised propositions in Y.) 
Where the earlier strategies relax universal domain and anonymity, this 
strategy would relax systematicity. It would argue for taking a different line on 
how the collective view on some propositions should be determined from the 
line that is taken on how the collective view on others should be fixed.  
The priority strategy is nicely exemplified by the premise-driven approach 
described earlier. This consists precisely in taking certain propositions as prior, 
treating them as potential premises in a modus ponens pattern of reasoning, and 
letting the collective, majority-determined views on those premises dictate the 
collective view to be taken on the conclusion. The priority strategy promises to 
be a successful way for a group to ensconce rationality at the collective level, 
whenever there is a prospect of agreement on which propositions to prioritise.  
But such agreement, of course, will not always be forthcoming. There is no 
independent mark of priority attaching to those propositions that ought to be 
treated in the manner of premises, as distinct from those that ought to be treated 
as conclusions. True, the propositions that are to be treated as premises will have 
to be logically independent of one another — they will have to allow of any 
distribution of truth-values — since otherwise they will be liable to give rise in 
themselves to discursive paradox. But consistently with that condition, there may 
be a variety of different possible 'premise' sets.  
What determines whether someone will see a proper subset of the 
propositions on which they and their group have to judge as fit to be treated as 
premises? People often differ in the background assumptions they make as to 
which sorts of propositions matter most, and for this reason they will often differ 
in which propositions, if any, they see as fit for treatment as premises. For one 
person certain atomic propositions like P, Q and R may seem most natural to be 
treated as premises in relation to a compound proposition, say ¬(P∧Q∧R), on 
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which they also have to judge. For another it may seem that that compound 
proposition lends itself more readily to resolution than any of the atomic 
propositions, so that assent to the atomic propositions ought to be shaped by 
whether the compound proposition commands assent, not the other way around. 
One individual’s conclusion may be another’s premise; one individual’s modus 
ponens may be another’s modus tollens.  
Relaxing completeness: the special-support strategy 
A fourth strategy that a group might employ to get around our 
impossibility result would be to give up explicitly on completeness. The strategy 
might involve treating only those propositions that command some special 
degree of assent together with their deductive closure as collectively endorsed. 
Take for example the strategy requiring unanimous assent on any proposition 
that is to be collectively endorsed.This procedure would constitute a judgment 
aggregation function generating consistent and deductively closed sets of 
collective judgments that satisfies universal domain, anonymity and 
systematicity. It would not, of course, guarantee completeness. There might be 
many propositions in the set to be decided such that neither they nor their 
negations are collectively endorsed.  
This strategy has its attractions as an escape route from our result. Let the 
incompleteness that it would introduce not inhibit a group from getting on with 
its business, whatever that is, and the strategy is bound to prove fetching. There 
are not many cases where the incompleteness is likely to be innocuous, however. 
In most situations a group that could only decide on judgment and action when 
members were in significant agreement about the issues involved would be 
unable to get anything done; it would be in a state of suspended animation.  
The strategy envisaged raises the question as to how far it can work with 
degrees of special support that are less than unanimity and, as it happens, there 
is a general result that bears on the matter. Let a supermajority of more than (k-
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1)/k of the individuals be required, rather than anything as simple as unanimity, 
where k is the number of propositions to be voted on (counting each 
proposition/negation pair as one proposition). In other words, let the procedure 
whereby collective judgments are to be formed be this: the individuals vote on 
each proposition and a proposition is collectively endorsed only if it is supported 
by a supermajority. The procedure of voting by this supermajority will satisfy 
universal domain, anonymity and systematicity and generate consistent 
collective sets of judgments. While the collective sets of judgments may not 
satisfy completeness, deductive closure can be assured so long as systematicity is 
relaxed: this is unsurprising, since a proposition might be included in the 
relevant deductive closure without itself commanding the requisite 
supermajority assent. The relevant theorem can be folmulated as follows.  
Theorem 3. (List 2001) Suppose there are k propositions to be voted on (counting 
each proposition/negation pair as one proposition). Proposition-wise 
supermajority voting with a threshold of (k-1)/k constitutes a judgment 
aggregation function F generating consistent (but not necessarily complete and 
deductively closed) collective sets of judgments which satisfies universal 
domain, anonymity and systematicity. Moreover, the function G, defined as the 
deductive closure of F, constitutes a judgment aggregation function generating 
consistent and deductively closed (but not necessarily complete) collective sets of 
judgments which satisfies universal domain and anonymity (but not necessarily 
systematicity).  
Relaxing consistency and relaxing deductive closure: two unattractive strategies 
And so, finally, to the last two types of strategy that a group might 
envisage. The first would take the group to be committed to all the propositions 
that command majority assent — or that pass whatever criterion of aggregation 
is employed — and to the deductive closure of those positively endorsed 
propositions. This would have the result that, while complete, the set of 
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propositions collectively endorsed might be inconsistent: they might be like the 
inconsistent propositions endorsed in the configuration of table 2.  
The second unattractive strategy would take the group to be committed to 
all the propositions that command majority assent (jointly with some tie-
breaking rule) — or that pass whatever criterion of aggregation is employed — 
but not to their deductive closure. The set of collective judgments, under this 
approach, would be complete and in a weak technical sense consistent; it would 
not contain a proposition and its negation. But, not being deductively closed, the 
judgments in the set might be such that were the group to endorse their 
implications, then it would immediately lapse into such inconsistency.  
Neither of these strategies is likely to be attractive for any group that faces 
the need to aggregate judgment. Where the first three strategies seek to moderate 
the domain of individual judgments considered admissible or the extent to 
which the collective judgments are responsive to individual judgments, the last 
two strategies belong with the fourth in seeking to establish something less than 
the rule of rationality in the collective judgments of a group. But what the last 
two seek to establish, unlike the fourth, is something that departs too far from 
rationality to have any attraction. The fourth strategy would merely make the 
collective judgments of a group incomplete in the sense defined. The last two 
strategies would makes those judgments so irrational that it is hard to see how 
they could serve to guide action.  
Conclusion 
The types of strategy just reviewed are very broad in character and allow 
both of variation and mixture. An exploration of the strategies at a greater level 
of detail, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper, as is the 
development of technical results that would build on the simple theorem 
presented here. We hope only to have indicated that our impossibility result and 
the conditions associated with it provide useful guidance in approaching the 
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question of how collectivities can manage to be relatively responsive to the 
judgments of their members and yet relatively rational in the judgments they 
collectively endorse. It turns out that while the impossibility result prevails, still 
there are familiar tactics that groups have established for circumventing its 
practical implications.6 
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Appendix. A Simple Impossibility Theorem on the Aggregation of Judgment*  
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a set of individuals (we assume that n≥2). Let X = {φ1, φ2, φ3, 
...} be a set of well-formed formulae of the propositional calculus, interpreted as 
the set of propositions on which simultaneous judgments are to be formed. We 
assume that X contains at least two distinct atomic propositions, P and Q, and 
their conjunction, (P∧Q).7 Moreover, we assume that X contains proposition-
negation pairs, specifically, whenever φ∈X, then ¬φ∈X (the negation of φ is 
contained in X) or ψ∈X where φ = ¬ψ (φ is the negation of another proposition 
contained in X). 
 
To each individual i in N, there corresponds a personal set of judgments Φi ⊆ X, 
where Φi is interpreted as the set of all those propositions in X to which 
individual i assents. Note that, if a proposition φ is not contained in Φi, this 
means only that it is not the case that individual i assents to φ; it does not by itself 
mean that individual i assents to the negation of φ. Rather, individual i assents to 
the negation of φ only if ¬φ is contained in Φi (or if ψ is contained in Φi where φ = 
¬ψ).  
 
A profile of personal sets of judgments is an n-tuple {Φi}i∈N, containing one personal 
set of judgments Φi for each individual i in N. A judgment aggregation function is a 
function F whose input is a profile of personal sets of judgments and whose 
                                                 
* This appendix is the work of Christian List. 
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output is a collective set of judgments Φ ⊆ X, where Φ is interpreted as the set of all 
those propositions in X to which the group N assents. 
 
A (personal or collective) set of judgments Φ is said to be complete if, for all φ in X, 
at least one of φ∈Φ, ¬φ∈Φ, or ψ∈Φ, where φ = ¬ψ, holds. Completeness is the 
requirement that, for every proposition-negation pair, at least one of the two be 
accepted. Φ is said to be consistent if, for all φ in X, at most one of φ∈Φ or ¬φ∈Φ 
holds. Consistency is the requirement that, for every proposition-negation pair, 
at most one of the two be accepted. Φ is said to be deductively closed if, for any ϕ in 
X, if Φ logically entails ϕ, then ϕ∈Φ. Deductive closure is the requirement that a 
proposition be accepted if it is a logical implication of other accepted 
propositions. 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible 
profiles of complete, consistent and deductively closed personal sets of 
judgments. 
 
ANONYMITY (A). For any {Φi}i∈N in the domain of F and any permutation σ : N → 
N, F({Φi}i∈N) = F({Φσ(i)}i∈N). 
 
SYSTEMATICITY (S). There exists a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that, for any 
{Φi}i∈N in the domain of F, F({Φi}i∈N) = {φ∈X : f(δ1(φ), δ2(φ), ..., δn(φ)) = 1}, where, for 
each i in N and each φ in X, δi(φ) = 1 if φ∈Φi and δi(φ) = 0 if φ∉Φi. 
 
Theorem 1. There exists no judgment aggregation function F generating 
complete, consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments which 
satisfies (U), (A) and (S).  
 
Proof.8 Suppose F satisfies (U), (A) and (S) and generates complete, consistent 
and deductively closed collective sets of judgments. By assumption, we may 
assume that P, Q, (P∧Q), ¬(P∧Q)∈X. 
 
Step (1). Since F satisfies (S), there exists a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that, for 
any {Φi}i∈N in the domain of F, F({Φi}i∈N) = {φ∈X : f(δ1(φ), δ2(φ), ..., δn(φ)) = 1}, 
where, for each i in N and each φ in X, δi(φ) = 1 if φ∈Φi and δi(φ) = 0 if φ∉Φi. Since 
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F satisfies (A), for any (d1, d2, ..., dn) ∈ {0, 1}n and any permutation σ: N → N, f(d1, 
d2, ..., dn) = f(dσ(1), dσ(2), ..., dσ(n)), and thus for any (d1, d2, ..., dn), (e1, e2, ..., en)∈{0, 1}n, 
f(d1, d2, ..., dn) = f(e1, e2, ..., en) if |{i ∈ N : di = 1}| = |{i ∈ N : ei = 1}|. For each φ∈X, 
define Nφ := {i∈N : φ∈Φi}. Then, for any φ, ψ∈X, if |Nφ| = |Nψ|, then φ∈F({Φi}i∈N) 
if and only if ψ∈F({Φi}i∈N). 
 
Step (2). By assumption, n≥2. Consider a profile of personal sets of judgments 
{Φi}i∈N with the following properties:  
 
 δi(P) δi(Q) δi((P∧Q)) 
 
δi(¬(P∧Q)) 
 
i = 1 1 1 1 0 
i = 2 1 0 0 1 
i = 3 0 1 0 1 
i > 3 and i is 
even 
1 1 1 0 
i > 3 and i is  
odd 
0 0 0 1 
Table 3 
 
Let Φ = F({Φi}i∈N). 
 
Case (i). n is even. We have |N(P∧Q)| = |N¬(P∧Q)|, whence (P∧Q)∈Φ if and only if 
¬(P∧Q)∈Φ. By the completeness of Φ, at least one of (P∧Q)∈Φ or ¬(P∧Q)∈Φ 
must hold. But then we must have both (P∧Q)∈Φ and ¬(P∧Q)∈Φ, which 
contradicts the assumption that Φ is consistent. 
 
Case (ii). n is odd. We have |NP| = |NQ| = |N¬(P∧Q)|, whence either all, or none, 
of P∈Φ, Q∈Φ and ¬(P∧Q)∈Φ must hold.  
 
If P∈Φ, Q∈Φ and ¬(P∧Q)∈Φ, then, since P, Q∈Φ, Φ logically entails (P∧Q), and 
hence, by the deductive closure of Φ, (P∧Q)∈Φ. But then both ¬(P∧Q)∈Φ and 
(P∧Q)∈Φ, and Φ violates consistency, which contradicts the assumption that Φ is 
consistent.  
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If P∉Φ, Q∉Φ and ¬(P∧Q)∉Φ, then, by the completeness of Φ, (P∧Q)∈Φ, but since 
(P∧Q) logically entails P, and Φ is deductively closed, we must have P∈Φ, a 
contradiction. Q.E.D. 
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1 For the moment we say little in detail on what precisely ‘rationality’ requires, 
whether in an individual or in a collectivity; we remedy that defect in section 3, 
when we turn to the impossibility result proper.  
2 Deliberative democrats often focus on groups of this kind, urging that 
particular decisions should be made on the basis of commonly agreed 
commitments — say, commonly accepted judgments as to the shared interests of 
members of the group. Deliberative democrats argue that such groups ought to 
be inclusive, judgmental and dialogical (see Bohman and Rehg 1997; Elster 1998; 
Pettit 2001b). All members should be equally entitled to participate in the 
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decision on how to resolve relevant collective issues, or bundles of issues. Before 
making the actual decision, members should deliberate on the basis of 
presumptively common concerns about which judgments they should make. 
And members should conduct this deliberation in open and unforced dialogue 
with one another, whether in a centralised forum or in various decentralised 
contexts. When deliberative democrats argue for this sort of procedure, then they 
are arguing precisely that the groups in question should aggregate sets of 
judgments, not just aggregate their particular preferences. 
3 Note that this is a rather weak syntactic notion of consistency. It requires only 
that no proposition and its negation be simultaneously accepted, but not that 
there exists a semantic model (a consistent assignment of truth-values to all 
propositions) that would make all the accepted propositions simultaneously true. 
On the given weak syntactic notion of consistency, the set {P, (P→Q), ¬Q}, for 
instance, is consistent, since no proposition and its negation are both contained in 
it. On a stronger semantic notion of consistency, by contrast, the set is not 
consistent, since there exists no semantic model that would make all the 
propositions in this set simultaneously true. The conjunction of our weak 
syntactic notion of consistency and deductive closure entails the stronger 
semantic notion. 
4 Systematicity is a undeniably a demanding condition. It requires that the 
collective judgment on a given proposition be dependent only on the individual 
assent/dissent pattern on that proposition, not on what the proposition is. One 
might weaken systematicity by allowing a dependency of the collective 
judgment not only on the individual assent/dissent pattern on the given 
proposition, but also on its syntactic structure. An interesting question for future 
research is the following. Define an equivalence relation ~ on the set X of all 
propositions -- for instance by stipulating φ ~ ψ if and only if φ and ψ have the 
same syntactic structure --, and ask whether the impossibility result of the 
  
32
                                                                                                                                                 
present paper persists, or fails to persist, if condition (S) is replaced with the 
following, weaker condition (S~).  
SYSTEMATICITY WITH RESPECT TO ~ (S~). For any two propositions φ and 
ψ in X, where φ and ψ belong to the same equivalence class with respect to ~, if 
every individual in N makes exactly the same judgment (assent/dissent) on φ as 
he or she makes on ψ, then the collective judgment (assent/dissent) on φ should 
also be the same as that on ψ, and the same pattern of dependence of collective 
judgments on individual ones should hold for all profiles in the domain of F. 
Condition (S) is simply the special case of (S~) where all propositions in X belong 
to the same equivalence class with respect to ~. We here restrict our 
consideration to condition (S) because it seems to us that the condition of 
systematicity is intuitively most compelling if it is interpreted as the requirement 
that all propositions be treated in an even-handed way. Propositionwise majority 
voting is a paradigm example of a judgment aggregation function satisfying 
systematicity in this strong form. 
5 It is worth noting that, if even numbers of individuals are permitted and the 
domain of admissible profiles of personal sets of judgments is not restricted, 
propositionwise majoritary voting is already ruled out by the conditions of 
completeness and consistency of collective sets of judgments. For in cases of ties 
between P and ¬P -- an equal number of individuals supporting P and ¬P -- 
either both or neither will be supported collectively by propositionwise majority 
voting, depending on how ties are dealt with. At first sight, this might seem to 
suggest that our impossibility result is just an unsurprising consequence of the 
possibility of ties. However, the result is much more general and holds for any 
number of individuals, including an odd number, where there can be no ties if 
personal sets of judgments are complete and consistent.  
6 This paper developed from joint discussion and exploration of themes raised in 
Pettit (2001b) but the formal proof of the impossibility result is the work of 
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Christian List. We wrote the paper when List was a Harsanyi Program Visitor at 
the Research School of Social Sciences, ANU, in March-Sept 2000. We wish to 
express our gratitude to Geoffrey Brennan, Campbell Brown, John Dryzek, 
Robert Goodin, Wlodek Rabinowicz and an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
comments and discussion. The paper was presented on a number of seminars, 
including a conference in honour of Isaac Levi, at Columbia University in 
October 2000. We were greatly helped by the comments of participants, in 
particular the follow-up comments given us by John Collins and Teddy 
Seidenfeld.  
7 Note that the use of conjunction (∧) here is not essential, but that the use of 
other logical connectives would yield a similar result. Particularly, as the set of 
connectives {¬, ∧} is expressively adequate, any logically possible proposition of 
the propositional calculus can be expressed as a proposition using ¬ and ∧ as the 
only connectives. 
8 We are indebted to Marek Kaminski for a suggestion on how to substantially 
simplify the proof. 
